

Agenda 2020 and The Olympic Movement¹

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The Olympic Movement has suffered two major crises in as many decades. In the late 1990s, a bribery scandal in connection with the awarding of rights to host Olympic Games combined with the epidemic of performance-enhancing drug use to produce a full-blown legitimacy crisis. For a time, it was not clear that the International Olympic Committee (IOC) could maintain authority and control over the Olympic Games which, therefore, might not have survived in the form we know them. In response to the crisis, the World Anti-Doping Agency (WADA) was established, and the IOC 2000 Commission was empanelled to recommend reforms. When corrupt members were banished and the IOC Session enacted all of the Commission's recommendations, involving major changes in governance, the crisis eventually passed and the IOC regained control of its own destiny.²

From Crisis to Crisis

In the present decade, a new threat emerged centered on Olympic Games bidding, and in 2013-14 another major crisis ensued, one that remains on-going today. In a nutshell, fewer and fewer global cities were interested or able to bid to host the Olympic Games. The nutmeat inside that nutshell is that Europe itself was turning against the Olympics, the same Europe that has been the historic and jealous fatherland of the Olympic Movement from its outset. Moreover, the rebellion was increasingly a popular one, as government entities and local elites favoring a Games candidature were forced to accept public referenda—which the IOC had always disfavored—or else were newly constrained by opinion polls that turned out to be strongly anti-Games. One after another, European citizenries turned down the Olympics. In the contest for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games, local and regional referenda first took out St. Moritz/Davos, Switzerland and Munich, Germany. Still, in November 2013, the IOC failed to recognize any writing on the wall and celebrated having six candidates for 2022.³ Then in January 2014, the Swedish authorities pulled the plug on Stockholm, and the political situation in the Ukraine led Lviv to withdraw as well. In May, 70% of Karkow's citizens voted against their Olympic project, and Poland quit the race. Norway was the final straw that broke the camel's back.

With the candidates for 2022 whittled to three—Oslo, Norway; Almaty, Kazakhstan; Beijing, China—the IOC, as made perfectly plain in its July 2014 Working Group Report,⁴ was all set to have Oslo rescue the entire situation. In retrospect, the IOC's overconfidence seems fantastically presumptuous, even foolhardy. But from Lausanne's point of view, everything appeared favorably aligned: the organizational hero of Lillehammer Gerhard Heiberg was leading the new bid; Oslo's citizenry had voted 55% in favor in 2013; Norway had accepted to host the 2016 Youth Olympics; the IOC had hundreds of millions it

would simply hand to the OCOG; the country was among the wealthiest and happiest around; and Norway's famous national delight in its Winter Games champions would only be greater at home. True, the IOC's own polling had found only 36% in support in the Oslo area, with 50% firmly against, and 36% was the same figure for national support in a separate poll conducted by the bid committee.⁵ That these facts had been wished away is made evident by the shock and bitter vituperation in the IOC's public statements after the Norwegian government announced on 1 October 2014 that it would not finance an Oslo Games, leaving the sport and city authorities no option but to withdraw the bid. 'We've received clear advice and there is no reason not to follow this advice', announced Conservative Prime Minister Ema Solberg after the ruling Conservative and Progress party deputies turned against an Oslo Games. 'A big project like this, which is so expensive, requires broad public support and there isn't enough support for it'.⁶

Cut to the quick, the IOC leadership lashed out in turn. In his press conference, IOC president Thomas Bach was alternately angry and patronizing: 'All this shows that this was very much a political decision. This is why we are feeling so sorry for sport in Norway and the athletes'. A press release from Olympic Games director Christophe Dubi was widely quoted: 'Senior politicians in Norway appear not to have been properly briefed on the process and were left to take their decisions on the basis of half-truths and factual inaccuracies. For a country of such means, full of so many successful athletes and so many fanatical winter-sports fans, it is a pity that Oslo will miss out on this great opportunity to invest in its future and show the world what it has to offer'.⁷ Dubi went on to imply both Norwegian incompetence and a political set-up. 'Earlier this year the Norwegian bid team asked for a meeting with the IOC for an explanation of all aspects of the IOC requirements, including the financial details, and the IOC arranged this for all three bid cities in order to insure fair play amongst the three bids. Unfortunately, Oslo sent neither a senior member of the bid team nor a government official to this meeting'. The IOC, in other words, had all the answers; self-interested and unpatriotic Norwegian 'politicians' didn't want to hear them.⁸

The IOC was now left with a choice of Almaty and Beijing for 2022, and in the aftermath of Sochi and a dearth of announced candidates for the 2024 Olympics, the press was not slow to draw a damning conclusion. A recent headline in *The Independent*, British newspaper, typifies this continuing discourse: 'Will Norway's refusal to meet the eye-watering demands of the IOC be the moment the world realizes only dictators can host Olympics?'.⁹

Thomas Bach and Agenda 2020

Thomas Bach was elected IOC president in September 2013. He made it immediately clear that he intended more than the usual new president's review of the overall organization. After an internal staff audit and an Executive Board retreat in December, the 'Olympic Agenda 2020' study project was presented to and approved by the IOC Session in February 2014. Bach was a veteran of the IOC 2000 Commission, having served as one of its Working Group chairs and as a chief Samaranch lieutenant in shepherding its recommendations through the IOC Session.

IOC 2000 now served as the model for Agenda 2020, with a key difference that extramural organizations and the general public were now seriously invited to submit their opinions to the commission.¹⁰ Thomas Bach descends from a line of German Olympic leaders with sincere and educated interests in the historical, social, and cultural aspects of the Olympic Movement, as befits a nation where 'Olympic education' has penetrated more than anywhere else into both scholarly and popular cultures. Anyone who knew Bach from his early days well understood his intellectual and moral commitments to Olympism as a real social movement and his particular interest in cultural matters.¹¹ At the same time, as himself a corporate lawyer and board member, his climb to IOC leadership coincided with the rising influence of the commercial and media corporations and the professional managerial elites in Olympic affairs, what I have elsewhere called the conquest of the Olympic Movement by the Olympic Sports Industry.¹² Which Thomas Bach habitus would typify his presidency? Bach's forthright handling of the sexual discrimination controversy that arose in connection with Sochi and his strong speeches in the opening and closing ceremonies of those Games were actions that his two immediate and more cautious predecessors could never have taken. There was clearly a new style IOC president, and this boded well for Agenda 2020 being a serious reevaluation. By April, fourteen working groups had been established to prepare recommendations to be voted on at an extraordinary session the following December.¹³

Their work coincided exactly with the developing bid cities crisis, whose main events were listed above. Just as number one and two on the roster of Agenda 2020 working groups--'Bidding Procedure' and 'Sustainability and Legacy'--left no doubt as to the sources of immediate concern, so too each successive defection from the contest for the 2022 Winter Games increased the pressure on IOC members to respect the Agenda 2020 process and to anticipate real change. The crisis provoked by the resignation of Norway in October initiated a month in which the Agenda 2020 recommendations were being screened and consolidated for the Executive Board and the Extraordinary Session to vote upon 4-9 December 2014. Once again, as with the IOC 2000 Commission, the IOC membership passed every one of Agenda 2020's recommendations.

Public Charges Against the IOC

In June 2014 an unprecedented document was issued by four European National Olympic Committees (NOCs), each of whom had endured a failed, that is to say a publically rejected, Olympic bid effort. The presidents or secretaries general of the German, Austrian, Swiss, and Swedish NOCs offered their analysis and recommendations as a contribution to Agenda 2020.¹⁴ Specific recommendations in this insiders' document—judgments based on real knowledge—will be discussed momentarily. But first, it is critical to note how its authors acknowledged and frankly pleaded with the IOC for help against public opinion—judgment without expert knowledge--empowered by the new referendum and polling regime that had taken hold in democratic, Olympic Europe. Reviewing negative results of referenda in Germany, Switzerland, Austria, and Poland, the document summarized the

overarching problem this way: 'The striking element welding all four committees together is the fact that all above mentioned bids were not lost in the official bid process, but due to a lack in national or at least regional public or political support'.

The developments in the latest bid race for the 2022 Winter Olympic Games make it very clear that it has become increasingly difficult for established sports nations to communicate the Olympic values and benefits that arise from bidding and hosting the Games. Citizens as well as politics mainly focus on the demands the IOC makes but barely know about the great support it provides. As a result, more and more nations, especially European nations, either not dare to submit an application any more or withdraw it later on as just happened in Stockholm and Krakow. This trend can also be observed when looking at the nations that reapply for the Games: The number of nations that apply for the Olympic Games for a second time after an unsuccessful bid significantly decreased within the past five bid cycles. In the current race for 2022 is no single nation that bid for the 2018 Olympic Games.¹⁵

An extraordinary feature of this document is that the NOC officers see nothing whatsoever that they could have done or that future bid committees can do to change public opinion. Instead they place the burden entirely on the IOC, which must climb down from its ivory tower, face the public, and get to work. The IOC 'has to provide interested cities and NOCs with more information and has to support them in dealing with IOC-related criticism (e.g. with regards to the Host City Contract, the revenue distribution, etc.)'. The IOC has to change its arcane language so that a broader public can understand the budget structure. It has to open a real dialogue with bidding cities much earlier in the process. 'Apart from content-related support in the form of concrete information, media kits and a more transparent and active communication, the IOC might also think about financial support to co-fund communication campaigns in interested countries' helping the IOC to be seen 'not as a counterpart but as a partner for interested cities'. In order to begin to cope with present currents in European public opinion, the IOC had to learn 'selling versus buying the Games'.¹⁶

Because of the historic pedigree of the modern Olympics, continental European public opinion about it may be fed by other sources than the mass media. Unlike, for example, North America, school curricula, museums, the pronouncements of sports ministries and NOCs may play a stronger role in Europe. But here too, there can be no doubt that print and broadcast media remain the dominant actor in shaping public opinion. The NOCs assert this themselves in opening their report.

What is the problem of established European nations to bid for the Olympics? The grounds cited sound very similar in all four countries: public and politics seemingly fear the high costs of bidding for and hosting the Games, especially in the aftermath of the increase of costs that was witnessed in Sochi as well as concerns relating to human rights and sustainability. The situation is aggravated by the media picturing mistrust in the IOC.¹⁷

It does not require a formal content analysis of media coverage of the bidding controversies in the relevant countries to recognize that the NOC report's authors have correctly identified its three main themes.¹⁸ The first we might thumbnail as 'cost overruns and white elephants', that is, all the issues having to do with finances, cost/benefit calculations, fiscal transparency, venues, accommodation demand, and local legacy versus transnational interests. The second is indeed 'mistrust of the IOC' itself, as the report politely phrases it. Finally, the discourse on human rights and ecology raises what I will call 'Olympic Movement' issues and marks a growing public skepticism as to whether any such thing still exists.

The differences between the press and by implication general public opinion and the NOCs' analysis lies in the relative weighting of these three concerns. Public discourse and the experts' report certainly agree, and correctly so, on the primacy of fiscal issues. However, with respect to the second and third themes, the report badly underestimates their presence and power in the press and their influence on public opinion. It is certainly true, as already indicated, that the NOCs place the entire burden of communications failure on the IOC, and public and press 'mistrust' in the institution is mentioned. But otherwise the report stays diplomatically silent on the IOC's public image, a misjudged tactic as Norway was about to reveal in spades. In fact in the press and public discourse in the effected regions, the IOC was (and is) often treated with outright skepticism and even contempt.¹⁹ While environmental sustainability is the only Olympic Movement issue treated in any depth in the report, its conclusion contains the devastating line that the committee's 'underlying aim [is] to regain credibility of the Olympic values'.²⁰

This paper will contend that while the Agenda 2020 process has gone some ways toward addressing the technical and fiscal issues in the bidding process, it has everything yet to do to engage firmly with the Olympic Movement issues that continue to undergird the absence of public confidence in Europe and the Americas.

Winter Olympic Games Costs and Scale

If one were to single out a point source poisoning the well of public discourse, it was worldwide press reporting through late 2013 and 2014 that the Sochi Winter Games had cost US \$51 billion.²¹ It is not clear where this figure originated or whether it reflected Russia's total investments in the Sochi area with any accuracy whatsoever. But whether out of antipathy to the Vladimir Putin regime, morbid fascination with how the contemporary Russian version of oligarchy and plutocracy functions, or the press's own anti-Olympic mood, the Sochi cost figure took on a life of its own in the European and American media. Olympic authorities proved powerless to counter it. Few journalists seemed to care about the IOC's distinction between the 'OCOG budget' and the 'non-OCOG budget', or 'operational costs versus infrastructure investments'.²² (This was the 'arcane' language the European NOCs complained about.) Never mind that Russia's costs involved building entire new towns, highways, and railways, and even rerouting a mountain river, in what some described as the largest development project in the world at that time. For the journalists, these were 'Olympic costs', period. While the general European public

surely recognized the monumental nature of the Sochi project, the \$51 billion price tag could not have helped proposed bid committee budgets for 2022 seem realistic. Whether it was Oslo's \$5.4 billion proposal, St. Moritz/Davos's \$2.6 billion, or Stockholm's \$1.5 billion (this very range promoted skepticism among local voters), the Sochi figure surely meant that it was unrealistic and that massive cost overruns were inevitable. Opposition groups had a field day. Atle Simonsen, head of the youth wing of one of Norway's ruling coalition partners exaggerated his figures but not the growing sentiment: 'Believing that the Oslo Olympics would cost under 50 billion kroner (\$8.4 billion) is like believing in Santa Claus, when the Sochi Olympics cost 500 billion'.²³

The focus of this paper is on what I have called the Olympic Movement issues associated with the current crisis of public confidence and partially addressed by Agenda 2020, not on the fiscal issues of Olympic Games bidding and hosting per se. However, since the latter helped trigger revelation of the former, a few summary comments must be made about Agenda 2020's treatment, in its 40 overall and 98 particular resolutions, of bid and host city issues.

Cost Reforms

In one key respect Agenda 2020 represents a major departure from the IOC's recent 'business model'. Beginning in the later Samaranch years and brought to fruition under the Rogge administration, the IOC adopted a franchiser/franchisee model in its relationship with host cities. The IOC and its stakeholders dictated to potential hosts what their bids should look like and demanded guarantees in the Host City Contract (HCC) that insulated the IOC from nearly all financial risk. The model was maximum control for the IOC, maximal risk for the host cities and national governments. While not consolidated into a single Agenda 2020 resolution, the entire document represents a turning away from this model to one where the IOC and the bid committees/OCOGs are conceived of as partners sharing more fully both responsibility and risk. As the senior IOC member Dick Pound recently put it to *The New York Times*, no longer was the IOC trying to impose a top-down 'made in Switzerland' approach. 'This is essentially a partnership. It's not good for [host cities] if you end up with a bunch of white elephants, and it's not good for [the IOC] to have unhappy host cities. Let's see if we can get this done on a win-win basis'.²⁴

In other respects, the IOC's core Olympic Games business model remains unchanged by Agenda 2020, for example in the conceptualization of Olympic budgets. As recommended by the European NOCs and many others, Recommendation 2(4) does commit 'the IOC to clarify the elements for the two different budgets related to the organization of the Olympic Games: long-term investment in infrastructure and return on such investment, on the one hand, and the operational budget on the other hand. Furthermore the IOC contribution to the Games to be further communicated and promoted'. A number of other resolutions having to do with increased budgetary transparency support these aims, notably making the HCC public (1[6]), detailing the IOC's contribution in it (1[7]), and bringing the audit practices of the IOC's own financial statements up to international standard (29 [1-2]). Though concrete applications have yet to appear, Resolution

1(9) newly allowed for 'other signatories' to the HCC than the host city and the NOC. This initiative was in part aimed at the Olympic funding situation in the United States and could be significant in the future.

The main emphasis in the Agenda 2020 resolutions, however, was in cutting costs for bidding committees and OCOGs. A number of resolutions marginally cut costs, for example by increasing the IOC's share of travel and hospitality expenses for bid delegations (3[2]), eliminating expensive printing of candidature files (3[3]), and registering approved lobbyists with an eye toward normalizing their fees (3[4]). But the most important resolutions, issued at the very top of Agenda 2020, fundamentally changed IOC policy on Games siting and therefore on potential venue costs. The IOC now committed itself to actively promoting use of existing, temporary, and demountable venues (1[2]), and preliminary competitions and even entire sports could be held outside the host city and even the host country where cost savings and sustainable legacy could be demonstrated (1[3-4]). The IOC would now score bids positively for the degree of such initiatives 'where no long-term venue legacy need exists or can be justified' (2[2]). The IOC was now on record against 'white elephants', and the very next resolution (2[3]), between its lines, attempts to insure active IOC resistance to International Federation (IF) pressures, a chief source over the years, exacerbated by the IOC 2000 governance reforms, of overbuilding in Olympic cities.²⁵ Increased transparency, 'systematic review of the level of services', and more 'turnkey solutions' for OCOGs are offered as means to reducing management costs (12[1-3]).

Have these changes resulting from Agenda 2020 put an end to the bidding crisis? It is far too soon to tell. Significant cost reductions have been claimed for the existing Tokyo and Pyeong'chang OCOGs because of the Agenda 2020 reforms, but the reality of those savings remains to be seen. Perhaps a definitive judgment on the main thrust of Agenda 2020 can only be attempted when it's known whether the Hamburg and Boston bids for the 2024 Olympic Games will survive their upcoming referenda. If not, Rome (and, at this writing, perhaps Paris and Budapest) will stand as the only European or North American bid(s).²⁶ It is my argument that longer term improvement will demand alteration of the IOC's image through a more clear and courageous relationship with the Olympic Movement. Agenda 2020's very mixed results on this front is the issue to which I now turn

The IOC and the Olympic Movement

To remind ourselves what the issues of public consciousness are, let us return briefly to Norway in 2014. On the very day the Norwegian government pulled the plug on the Oslo bid, Norwegian media from the mainstream *Dagbladet* to the tabloid *Verdens Gang* had a field day presenting as horrifying revelations from a purportedly '7,000 page IOC handbook' the IOC's 'high-handed demands' for its own comfort and convenience, such as a welcoming cocktail party with the Norwegian royal family at palace expense. Never mind that for Olympic insiders much of what was revealed has long been standard practice, and that the real offense, if there was one, was for some IOC staffer to have written all the perks out as a manual. But in Norwegian public culture, it was taken as the IOC demanding a deeply offensive

'pamper-party' for itself. Of course, Norway is a famously egalitarian culture, but there was also recent history here. Adult Norwegians would not have forgotten the local athletic hero Johan Olav Koss and his colleagues in Lillehammer shaming IOC president Samaranch into descending from his luxury hotel to eat a meal with the athletes in the Olympic Village, or their athletes' role in forcing the IOC to take greater account of the tragedy unfolding simultaneously in the former Olympic city of Sarajevo.

It is quite possible to sympathize with the difficulty of confronting the sometimes irrational public hostility to the IOC while still complaining of its own weakness in defending the organization. It is altogether remarkable how the current worldwide commentary on FIFA bribery and corruption has led to no discernible comparison with the IOC's freedom from such abuses after the IOC 2000 reform process. Surely the IOC might have been expected to take advantage of the current FIFA scandal to point to itself as an illustration of how a major sport body can be cleansed (even with Sepp Blatter as a current member).

The Agenda 2020 resolutions directed at the IOC itself are, for the most part, of little help; they read too often like corporate boilerplate. Complying with good governance principles (27[1-3]), increasing financial transparency on member allowances (29[2]), having the Ethics Commission elected by the Session (30) and rewriting the Code of Ethics and Rules of Procedure (32), appointing a compliance officer (31), reviewing the commission structure (40): these are perfectly credible steps but unlikely to dent the public image problems from which the organization suffers. Though not yet implemented, two other resolutions are more promising as they implicitly acknowledge public criticism that the IOC members may not now possess sufficient social, cultural, and political competence to face the decisions they are called upon to make. The IOC Nominations Commission is to actively target recruits for new membership instead of passively vetting applications, and, among other more familiar criteria, it should take account of 'the IOC's needs in terms of skills and knowledge (e.g. medical expertise, sociological expertise, cultural expertise, political expertise, business expertise, legal expertise, sports management expertise, etc.)' (38[1-2]).²⁷ The Evaluation Commission too should now 'benefit from third-party, independent advice in such areas as social, economic, and political conditions, with a special emphasis on sustainability and legacy' (2[6]). It will be interesting to learn whether these resolutions truly reflect a new humility on the IOC's part.

Whence might any real improvement in the IOC's public image and presence be expected to come from, then? For an initial clue, we can return to Norway where, as previously noted, one factor in the IOC's surprise at the country's withdrawal from bidding for 2022 was its enthusiastic hosting of the 2016 Winter Youth Olympic Games (YOGs) in Lillehammer. Little or no criticism of the IOC had been heard in that context. The YOGs are manifestly and foundationally associated with international friendship and understanding, culture, education, youth development, and festivity, that is to say, with key Olympic Movement themes. (Indeed, some have suggested that initiation of the YOGs was an implicit confession of the transformation of the regular Olympic Games into commercial spectacle.)²⁸

Evidently, when the IOC is more closely associated with the Olympic Movement than with the Olympic Sports Industry, public criticism of the organization is muted.

If the phrase 'Olympic Movement' is to be rescued from cliché, it must be always be remembered that from the ordinary language as well as the technical sociological points of view, 'movement' must mean exactly that. It is about passionate, determined, relentless action in favor of unrealized and difficult, perhaps even utopian goals. Therefore, a true movement is always against something or someone; it depends on having very particular and not just abstract antagonists. It can be judicious in picking its battles, but it cannot ever be afraid of standing up for itself. A true movement is always about *charismatic* struggle; its enemy, as the great Max Weber taught as his central doctrine, is rationalization, particularly of the interwoven bureaucratic/managerial and the economic kinds. Movements die when they become too evidently concerned with the material consequences of principled action.

Precisely such a spirit of rationalization has come to dominate Lausanne over the past quarter century. While a great deal of media and public discourse in democratic Europe and North America today conceives of the IOC and the IFs as adventurer or patrimonial capitalists (to continue with Weberian language), actual bid and organizing committees have come to experience the IOC, its staff in particular, as relentless professional routinizers, purveyors of 'one size fits all' rules, what Canadian IOC member Dick Pound now refers to as 'the made in Switzerland approach'.²⁹ As we have noted, the main thrust of the Agenda 2020 resolutions was to reform this relationship between Lausanne and host cities. But what of Agenda 2020's direct address to Olympic Movement issues?

An initial reading of the resolutions can only be disappointing in this regard. Most seem a case of 'round up the usual suspects'. 'Sustainability' is used as a blanket theme covering 'legacy' and socio-economic matters, as we have already noted (4[1-3]). Otherwise it means environmentalism, a further 'going green' that is hardly unfamiliar (5[1-3]). Gender equality must continue to be fostered (11[1-2]), relations with differently abled sport must be strengthened (7), clean athletes must be better protected (15-16[1-2]), sport and culture are to be further 'blended' (26 [1-2]), and 'Olympic values-based education' is to be more widely spread (22 [1-3]). With respect to the last, there is no particularization of 'Olympic values' offered, and this absolutely deadening language, an epitome of 'routinized charisma' if there ever was one, functions once again to destroy rather than to promote any sense of a real social movement. Then there is Resolution 23 under the promising title of 'Engage with communities', but its particularizations are either too trivial (create virtual hubs for athletes and volunteers) or utterly vague ('engage with the general public' and youth). A further resolution belonging to the field known as sport for development and peace and referencing the IOC's Sport for Hope program in Zambia and Haiti and another called Olympafrica (24[1-3]) was notably noncommittal and unlikely to interest anyone not directly concerned with those initiatives.

While I do not wish at all to suggest that issues like environmentalism, anti-doping, sport for development, or culture and education are unimportant, they are not taken up in Agenda 2020 in any way calculated to excite a new sense of Olympic *movement*, as previously defined. Though I take extremely seriously Resolution 17--

providing real victory ceremonies for those who receive medals after a doping disqualification—that is because I am convinced that protection and revitalization of the Olympic ritual system is key to rescuing the Olympic Movement from the forces of spectacularization.³⁰ But I cannot repeat such arguments here, and I acknowledge that few readers may even have noticed Resolution 17. Therefore, these resolutions are unlikely to help rebalance the IOC's public image where it is under severe attack. It is quite a different story with the complex of Olympic Movement issues customarily labeled 'human rights'. In the very first resolution, the IOC promises to 'include in the host city contract clauses with regard to Fundamental Principle 6 of the Olympic Charter as well as to environmental and labour-related matters' (1[5]). As to the Charter's anti-discrimination clause, Resolution 14 commits to 'strengthening' it: 'The IOC to include non-discrimination on sexual orientation in the 6th Fundamental Principle of Olympism.' This change had been called for by gay rights activists for some time, but was made a highly visible public issue by the passage of anti-gay legislation in Russia prior to the Sochi Olympics and the ensuing dramas over whether athletes and spectators would or would not be harassed by the Russian authorities or athletes punished by the IOC for any 'rainbow' demonstrations of conscience. From a human rights point of view, progressive political action in Sochi on this front offered some counterpoint to the '\$51 billion' problem. Moreover, future bids from certain parts of the world, for example, the Middle East were certain to keep the matter topical. Issues of labour exploitation and abuse and environmental depredations were also currently controversial, with respect to the Sochi and Beijing Olympics, the Qatar World Cup preparations, and the 2022 Olympic Winter Games bids of Almaty and Beijing. These bids are, of course, deep enmeshed in issues of political, ethnic, religious, and free speech intolerance already supposedly covered by Fundamental Principle 6 (as are the 2015 European Games in Baku, Azerbaijan). So with these resolutions, Agenda 2020 went directly to where the action is in the Olympic Movement, considered as a human rights movement, as well as to the center of contention for its 'rump' decision for 2022, a matter to which we shall return.

But to fully appreciate the significance of these moves, other easily overlooked resolutions in Agenda 2020 have to be highlighted. Resolutions 20 and 21 announce an entirely new approach to dealing with other 'movement' organizations in the world. The first calls for the IOC to enter into new 'strategic partnerships': 'The IOC to open up to cooperation and network with competent and internationally recognized organizations and NGOs to increase the impact of its programs'. The second commits the IOC to 'strengthening its advocacy capacity' by advocating itself 'to intergovernmental organizations and agencies' and 'encouraging and assisting NOCs in their advocacy efforts'.

Some recent historical context is required to understand the significance here. In 2000, the aforementioned Dick Pound made it a centerpiece of his campaign for the IOC presidency that the IOC should limit itself to its 'core business of sport' and retreat from any engagement with other international agencies and movements in the social, cultural, and political fields. Though Pound lost the presidency, the winner Jacques Rogge actually pursued this policy throughout his administration, with the notable exception of collaboration with the United Nations system. Both

figures were reacting against the Samaranch years, when, under the particular leadership of international relations director Fékrou Kidane, the IOC strongly allied itself with the anti-apartheid struggle in South Africa, developed its first cooperative ties with the UN, and participated in global feminist and environmentalist summits. Under Rogge and Kidane's successor Thomas Sithole, the IOC largely limited itself to meetings addressing international issues that the IOC itself mounted and controlled, and IGOs and NGOs other than the UN generally found the doors of Lausanne publically closed to them. Nowhere was this more true than with the major human rights NGOs.

The IOC and Human Rights Watch: A New Movement Paradigm

Thomas Bach has changed all this, and the Agenda 2020 resolutions just cited that were approved by the IOC Session codified these changes. Before Sochi, Bach went out of his way to publically welcome into his office organizations concerned with Russia's anti-gay propaganda in the run-up to Sochi.³¹ With respect to the human rights organizations, I'll discuss new relations with just one of the two most active in Olympic affairs, Human Rights Watch (HRW), which had for some time experienced the IOC as largely closed to public dialogue.³² Therefore, like other such organizations, HRW had replied with skepticism and press criticism of the IOC, thus further weakening Olympism's claims to social movement status. In April 2014, responding to Bach's 'call for outside contributions to the debate on the future of the Olympic Movement', HRW made a formal submission.

Since the founding of the Olympic Movement more than a century ago, the international community and the international sporting community have had growing expectations for the modernization and transparency of the Olympic Movement and respect for core Olympic values. Over the last decade, serious human rights abuses by some host countries linked to their preparations for hosting the Olympic Games have tarnished the Olympic Movement . . . The lesson from Sochi and the 2008 Beijing Olympics, where similar abuses occurred, is that awarding the Olympic Games to a country with a poor record on human rights and rule of law carries a strong risk that Olympic preparations will become a source of serious human rights abuses. To prevent further abuses, Human Rights Watch proposes concrete human rights reforms to the Olympic Charter, as well as requirements for the IOC to write human rights guarantees into the Host City Contracts and monitor implementations of those guarantees.

HRW noted that it was joining '33 international human rights organizations and LGBT groups' recommending amendment to Fundamental Principle 6 to include 'sexual orientation and gender identity'.³³ HRW went on to recommend that HCCs be made public and that evaluations of future host city candidates include human rights benchmarks on media freedom, labor rights, freedom of expression and association, liberty and security, and nondiscrimination.³⁴

Done, done, and done. Each of these requests was incorporated into the Agenda 2020 proposals and eventually passed by the IOC Session. Moreover, in his

highly publicized 21 October meeting with human rights NGO leaders, Bach provided concrete language for the new HCC, which HRW and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC), with IOC encouragement, subsequently released to the press. The HCC would require host countries to ‘take all necessary measures to ensure that development projects necessary for the organization of the Games comply with local, regional, and national legislation, and international agreements and protocols, applicable in the host country with regard to planning, construction, protection of the environment, health, safety, and labor laws’.³⁵

These actions earned the IOC its most favorable press since the bidding crisis began and, from an Olympic Movement point of view, perhaps since the day Nelson Mandela walked off Robben Island. ‘IOC New Host City Contract is Gold Medal for Human Rights Says Human Rights Watch’ read a typical headline, this one from Reuters.

Human Rights Watch has heaped unusual praise on the International Olympic Committee for including human rights clauses in new contracts to be signed by future Olympic host cities, saying other organizations should follow suit . . . The IOC has for years been criticized by human rights groups including HRW, especially after awarding the Olympic Games to China’s Beijing in 2008 and Russia’s Sochi in 2014 . . . ‘Gold Medal to IOC@Olympics + Thomas Bach for putting human rights in Host City Contracts’, said [Minky Worden] HRW Director of Global Initiatives in a tweet on Friday after meeting with IOC President Bach at the headquarters in Lausanne . . . ‘This new language will signify that future Olympic host countries and cities are contractually required, for example, to respect the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights along with international labor laws in relation to key freedoms’, HRW said in a statement.³⁶

Worden, editor of a volume on the human rights struggle leading up to the Beijing Games³⁷ and a leading critic of past IOC lassitude, pronounced herself thrilled at the new turn of events. ‘A year after taking office, Thomas Bach is changing the rules of the game’.³⁸ The IOC went from suspect laggard to paragon almost overnight. ‘The International Olympic Committees decision to include human rights protections in future host city contracts raises the bar for all sports federations . . . this is a sign of changing times in global sport. FIFA and other international sports federations should immediately follow the IOC’s lead’.³⁹

Subsequently, the IOC has followed through with Agenda 2020 resolution 2(6) vowing to seek ‘independent third-party advice’ as part of the work of the Olympic bid Evaluation Commission. In the ‘Report of the 2022 Evaluation Commission’, under the heading ‘Human Rights’, HRW is listed together with The Commission to Protect Journalists (CPJ) and the ITUC as the third party reports consulted in the evaluation of the Beijing and Almaty bids.⁴⁰ The relevant texts from the Evaluation Commission Report will be discussed in the concluding section of this paper. In keeping with another Agenda 2020 resolution (2[5]), such matters will be more fully aired in ‘in-camera discussion between the IOC members and the IOC Evaluation Commission’ in a revised format for the Candidate City Briefing before

July 2015 when the 2020 Winter Games decision will be made. In any case, there is no mystery about what HRW, CPJ, and ITUC would have told the Evaluation Commission about the current state of human rights in the PRC and in Kazakhstan. One has only to read the latest HRW country reports.⁴¹ What would be interesting to know is how HRW, Amnesty, and related NGOs would advise the IOC to choose in July 2015, Agenda 2020 having come too late to prevent an Almaty/Beijing conundrum. I will give my own opinion on this in concluding this paper.

Movement Means Mattering

First, let me perfectly clear that in pointing out that the IOC's new stance of collaboration has redounded to its public credit and offers a paradigm for moving forward in the future this does not mean at all that there is anything simple or non-problematic about either 'human rights' or the particular NGOs in question. I am by profession an anthropologist and historian. I know perfectly well the critique of the practical conception of human rights, particularly of 'universal' human rights, as a Western liberal construct that Western NGOs are attempting to impose in a biased and even imperialist fashion elsewhere in the world. This critique is indeed made by party-states such as the PRC to deflect foreign criticism, but it is also made by serious scholars who endeavor to generate culturally and historically informed conceptions of human rights in non-Western contexts, such as Daniel A. Bell in the case of the PRC.⁴² Typical of such attempts is to agree on the roster of human rights issues while arguing that different societies prioritize them differently in light of particular histories and stages of development. Thus Chinese tradition and current culture, for example, sees economic rights as the central human right with political and free speech rights to come later. Moreover, it is not just self-serving party elites but understandable public fear of mass violence that undergirds such a position. Analyses like these generate in turn their own critiques of Western human rights regimes that emphasize political and media rights and fetishize multi-party elections while ignoring economic rights and even worse, generating a neo-liberal ideological cover for massive and growing economic inequality.

The Chinese authorities behind the Beijing 2008 eventually arrived at a position very like that articulated by Daniel Bell.⁴³ This allowed them, unlike during the first Beijing bid in 1993, to assert in their final presentation to the IOC Session in 2001 that hosting the Games 'will also benefit the further development of our human rights cause'. This line was repeated through the ensuing period of strong foreign criticism and domestic protest in the run-up to the Games. A cadre of intellectuals, Chinese and foreign, worked with BOCOG to try to develop a double approach the definition of human rights in the hopes of tempering deeply felt criticisms by Western media and NGOs. The effort largely failed.⁴⁴ Now, in the run-up to the IOC's vote on Beijing's 2022 Winter Olympics bid, the whole scenario is being nearly exactly repeated, but with the added context that few in Europe, North and South America, Japan, South Korea, and elsewhere recognize any improvements in the Chinese human rights situation brought about by Beijing 2008. Indeed, looking from within the 'liberal perspective', the situation has gotten worse, especially under the various recent 'crackdowns' of the Xi Jinping regime. Today, the

International Tibet Network opens its latest white paper 'Losing the Bet on Human Rights: Beijing, Tibet, and the Olympic Games' by quoting then IOC Director General François Carrard from 2001: 'We are totally aware there is one issue on the table [concerning the Beijing bid], and that is human rights. Either you say because of some serious human rights issues, we close the door, deliver a vote that is regarded as a sanction and hope things evolve better. The other way is to bet on openness. We are taking that bet that we will see many changes'.⁴⁵ I strongly doubt that anyone is speaking quite that way today at Vidy. Certainly the Dalai Lama is not.

Yes, it's all so complicated, and no, there are no answers to put an end to the questions. But as the present crisis has revealed, there can be no going back to former days when the IOC could declare itself apolitical, the Olympic *Movement* could be ignored and therefore denigrated, and the question could simply reduce itself to who will put on the most spectacular sports event. Yes, the Olympic Movement is a peace movement, but that should never again be interpreted by the IOC as a demand for the world to leave it in peace. As I have tried to argue, there is not yet any certainty that the IOC can attract future Olympic bids from liberal democratic countries, even with the all the hosting reforms put in place by the Agenda 2020 process. To have that happen, the IOC must fundamentally alter its own public profile among such peoples, or else referenda and polls will keep going against it. To achieve this alteration, the IOC must revivify its commitment to the Olympic Movement, not by idle talk about 'Olympic values', but by throwing itself into the fray. Being a movement means moving on the things that matter most, or should matter most, not to some abstract Humanity but to real human beings. Public reaction to the IOC leadership's initiatives on human rights over the course of the Agenda 2020 process is pointing the way forward. Of course, that reaction will not be the same in every historical tradition and sociopolitical system. How could it be? The struggle is on again, and far from regretting or retreating from it, the IOC and its stakeholders should delight in beginning to matter again.

2022: The Devil's Alternative?

As we have seen, Norway's rebuke to the perceived arrogance of the IOC and the too late timetable of the Agenda 2020 process has left the IOC with the choice of Beijing, PRC and Almaty, Kazakhstan for the 2022 Winter Olympics, with the decision to be made one month from when I write. The details of the competing sports propositions will not be discussed here; the reader is referred to the Evaluation Commission Report. But for purposes of this concluding discussion, let's call that matter a draw, balancing off Almaty's 'for real' winter sports environment and ecologically much sounder and more compact project with Beijing's unlimited budget and assurance of managerial effectiveness and control.⁴⁶ In terms of the geo-cultural and geo-historical 'pilgrimage' of the Olympic Games, Almaty holds a distinct advantage. After an Olympic Games and a Youth Olympic Games, nothing further in this respect would be gained by a return to the PRC. Kazakhstan, however, is a hearth of Indo-European language and history, today a richly multicultural nation, and offering to stand as the first majority Muslim nation to host Olympic Games. These are matters of considerable importance in today's world. Still as is

clear to everyone, the main point of public attention and coming scrutiny of IOC action is the human rights situation in each country. In most discourse, the IOC is being presented with a 'Devil's Alternative'.

I take the phrase from the previously cited position paper of The International Tibet Network, the most important INGO focused on the condition of ethnic minorities in the PRC. The ITN concludes as follows:

The IOC must now consider whether, given [the 2001-2008 Beijing] experience, it can have a realistic expectation that it can help to secure an improvement in the human rights situation in Kazakhstan if Almaty is awarded the Games. In light of events since the award of the Games to Beijing, it is clear that no such improvement will take place in China. Unless Kazakhstan can provide clear evidence to the contrary, the IOC must recognize that the award of the Games to either city may actually embolden the countries [*sic*] governments to increase the suppression of human rights. The IOC must find the courage to admit this reality and cease from inflicting further damage on the reputation of the Olympic Games. [The 175] International Tibet Network member groups call upon the International Olympic Committee to reject China's bid and, in the context of events in China after the 2001 decision, to consider with extreme caution the bid of Kazakhstan.⁴⁷

In its political foundations section, the newly consultative and socially engaged Evaluation Commission has this to say about Almaty:

The political system in Kazakhstan has been relatively stable since the country achieved independence in 1991. President Nursultan Nazarbayev has been the only person to hold that office since then. During the evaluation process, the Commission considered statements and opinions from independent third-party reports with regard to environmental protection, the treatment of detainees, media freedom, Internet access, the right to demonstrate, and the integrity of the judicial and electoral systems. The commission raised these issues with Almaty 2022 and government authorities and sought assurances that the Host City Contract and the Olympic Charter would be respected for all participants of the Olympic Games and in Olympic related matters. At the same time, the IOC has to respect the laws of a sovereign state. Taking into consideration the open nature of the discussions and the assurances provided regarding the right to demonstrate, media freedom to report on the Games and Games preparations, with no restrictions on the internet, labour rights and displacement, the Commission believes that the Government of Kazakhstan would take all the necessary measures to ensure that the Olympic Charter and the Host City Contract are respected.⁴⁸

Is this sufficient? Of course not, especially since the Evaluation Commission reproduces almost identical prose in the Beijing section, encouraging skeptics to see this as just a new form of boilerplate. Such skeptics are also already questioning the

willingness or ability of an INGO like the IOC to take on sovereign states when they choose not to honor their contracts. Where exactly is the enforcement mechanism?

These concerns are crucial, of course, but they do not in my opinion represent the proper spirit for the IOC at this moment of Olympic history, a moment that could be a tipping point. Instead of a Devil's Alternative, why not see the present situation as a signal opportunity for action. Why not be in intensive backstage conversation with the Kazakh authorities—to be fair, the same would be done with the PRC but with scant hope of any success, any *movement*—as to what further alterations to present human rights practices and problems they would be willing to make to have the IOC give them the Olympic Games. Of course, the IOC may as yet lack the means to enforce any such promises, but their publication would surely represent to the public a continuing development of the IOC's new desire and willingness to be on the front foot with respect to human rights. Moreover, for all its present abuses, Kazakhstan is not the PRC. It is enough to compare the country reports on both nations from the IOC's new collaborator Human Rights Watch and its established one, the United Nations Human Rights Council. Kazakhstan underwent a UN-HRC Universal Periodic Review in October 2014, agreeing to some recommendations while rejecting others. The UN Committee on Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women and the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have also recently conducted reviews and made recommendations.⁴⁹ Of course, the Nazarbayev regime has its own imperatives and sovereign law is sovereign law, but to this reader it seems quite remarkable how much might be achieved, given these reports, with a little more push. The new IOC should take pride in pushing, whatever the objective chances of success. That is what charismatic movements do.

¹ Prepared for the conference *De l'Administration à la gouvernance olympique: défis pour notre siècle*. Lausanne, 25-26 June 2015. I thank Jean-Loup Chappelet for the kind invitation to participate.

² John J. MacAloon, 'Scandal and Governance: Inside and Outside the IOC 2000 Commission', *Sport in Society* 14 no.3 (2011), 292-308. Jean-Loup Chappelet, 'Towards Better Olympic Accountability', *Sport in Society* 14 no.3 (2011), 319-31.

³ The new IOC president Thomas Bach stated in a press release: "I am delighted that six cities are bidding to host the 2022 Olympic Winter Games. These cities and their supporters clearly understand the benefits that hosting the Games can have, and the long-lasting legacy that a Games can bring to a region." 'Six Cities Bid to Host 2022 Winter Olympics', BBC, 15 November, 2013.

⁴ International Olympic Committee, 'XXIV Olympic Winter Games Working Group Report', Lausanne, Switzerland, 2014.

⁵ 'Working Group Report', 29. Some speculated that the Norwegian NOC's rejection of a Tromsø bid as too expensive turned Norway's North against the capital.

⁶ 'Norway Withdraws Oslo Bid', Reuters, 1 October 2014.

⁷ 'Why Nobody Wants to Host the 2022 Winter Olympics', Time Magazine, 3 October 2014.

⁸ 'Norway Withdraws Oslo Bid'.

⁹ 9 June 2015. The tendentiousness of the rhetoric is revealed by the failure to discuss London 2012 in any serious way in the article. 'Norway's withdrawal from a race they were certain to win all but re-writes the criteria for a modern Olympic host: 1 A massive stadium of minimal practical use; 2 An unquestioning population; 3 A large stockpile of missiles. London, in the end, had all three, but it wasn't easy. North Korea already has the lot'.

¹⁰ Even the documents and petitions of groups of athletes were unwelcome by the IOC 2000 Commission. J. Koss, A. Peel, A. Orlando, 'Athletes' Rights and Olympic Reform', *Sport in Society* 14 no.3 (2011), 313-5. Agenda 2020's greater openness to public opinion took its precedent instead from the 13th Olympic Congress in Copenhagen, 2009. 'More than 40,000 submissions were received from the public during the process, generating 1,200 ideas'. International Olympic Committee, 'Olympic Agenda 2020: 20 + 20 Recommendations'.

¹¹ I first met Thomas Bach at the International Olympic Academy in the early 1980s, and our conversations on certain deep cultural structures organizing the Olympic performance system have stayed with me until this day. We disagreed on certain recommendations when he was chairing my culture and education section of the IOC 2000 Commission. (I found his pet proposal to award a medal for accomplishment in the arts at each Olympic closing ceremony terribly naïve and ethnocentric: who can define for 204 national cultures what is 'art' much less what has world aesthetic significance? He found my proposal to have the IOC members march in the opening ceremonies procession equally naïve: the members would never consent to present themselves so publically 'out of fear of being booed'.) But I have never found reason to doubt that he understood what the phrase 'Olympic Movement' has to mean to be real.

¹² 'Scandal and Governance', 293. See also, MacAloon, "'Legacy" as Managerial/Magical Discourse in Contemporary Olympic Affairs', *International Journal of the History of Sport* 25 no. 14 (2008), 2060-71.

¹³ The Agenda 2020 Working Groups were as follows: 1) Bidding procedure; 2) Sustainability and legacy; 3) Differentiation of the Olympic Games; 4) The Olympic program; 5) Olympic Games management; 6) Protecting clean athletes; 7) The Olympic television channel; 8) Olympism in action including youth strategy; 9) Youth Olympic Games; 10) Culture policy; 11) Good governance and autonomy; 12) Ethics; 13) Strategic review of sponsorship, licensing and merchandizing; 14) IOC membership. IOC, 'Agenda 2020, 126th IOC Session, 5-6 February 2014'. Lausanne.

¹⁴ Austrian Olympic Committee, German Olympic Sports Confederation, Swedish Olympic Committee, Swiss Olympic Association, 'Olympic Agenda 2020: The Bid Experience', Frankfurt: Proprojekt, 2014.

¹⁵ 'The Bid Experience', 4,6.

¹⁶ 'The Bid Experience', 6.

¹⁷ 'The Bid Experience', 4.

¹⁸ These summary comments derive from wide reading in the Anglophone and Francophone press. I would not expect any marked differences in the German,

Polish, Swedish, or Norwegian press, but would happily defer to anyone working in those languages.

¹⁹ This reticence is quite understandable, as the report's authors are close professional and in some cases personal associates with IOC leaders and members and are seeking to influence rather than to alienate that body with a public document that could already be seen in some IOC circles as a challenge to normal 'Olympic Family' protocol. It is also the case that a great deal of the press portrait of the contemporary IOC is ignorant and unfair, and the authors may well have consciously refused to reinforce such ignorance and yellow journalism.

²⁰ 'The Bid Experience', 13-14.

²¹ 'The simple reason why, of course, is Sochi, and the \$51 billion figure associated with the 2014 Olympic Olympics. That number has freaked out voters and governments alike. Layered on to that is public mistrust of the International Olympic Committee itself'. Alan Abrahamson, 'A Four-Nation Rethink of the IOC Bid Process', 3 Wire Sports, 15 July 2014, 1.

²² 'Agenda 2020, 126th IOC Session', 6.

²³ Quoted in Melissa Payne, 'Krakow Withdraws 2022 Olympic Bid after Residents Vote "No"', Washington Post, 27 May 2014.

²⁴ Katharine Q. Seelye, 'Boston Group Revises its Bid to Host 2024 Games', The New York Times, 17 June 2015.

²⁵ By making 'representative members' from the IFs voting members of the IOC, the 2000 reforms inadvertently increased pressure on bid committees to succumb to exorbitant IF demands for grandiose venues and service. MacAloon, 'Scandal and Governance'.

²⁶ The current FIFA scandal and Qatar 2022 World Cup disputes have lately made the country the international poster child for labor exploitation and abuse as well as climatological challenges, all in the context of regional political instability. As of this writing, Doha seems highly unlikely to bid for the 2024 Olympics, as was once expected. No other Emirates bid is presently expected for quite some time.

²⁷ The Nominations Committee was an important innovation of the IOC 2000 reform process, meant in part to restrict Juan Antonio Samaranch's personal selection of new members that had led to several disastrous decisions bringing the organization into ill repute in certain quarters around the world. But the Nominations Commission was seriously compromised at the outset and never developed into the effective agency its proponents intended. See MacAloon, 'Scandal and Governance'.

²⁸ Agenda 2020 called for a full review of the YOGs (25[1]), an action registering the belief of a significant fraction of the IOC that this pet project of Jacques Rogge should be allowed a dignified death. The YOGs were quickly taken over by the IFs and NOCs and have been increasingly transformed from the culture and education festival originally intended into a high performance youth sports competition under the model of U-20 and U-18 world championships.

²⁹ This new position is ironic since Pound was a chief proponent of IOC executive and staff professionalization and legal/managerial rationalization over the past two decades. Perhaps the situation has gotten so desperate in the current host city crisis that he is seriously rethinking his position. Then again, Mr. Pound has also always

carried himself and expected his IOC colleagues to respond to him as a charismatic figure.

³⁰ See John MacAloon, 'A Mere Series of World Championships? Pierre de Coubertin, the Ritual Difference, and the Future of the Olympic Games', in S. Wassong and N. Mueller, eds., *Pierre de Coubertin and the Future* (Mainz: University of Mainz Press, 2015).

³¹ For example, a Canadian delegation of gay athlete activists were stunned by the personal reception afforded to them in Lausanne by President Bach. Bruce Kidd, personal communication, April 2015.

³² Susan Brownell, 'Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics: Imagined Global Community and the Transnational Public Sphere', *The British Journal of Sociology* 63 (no. 2), 308. Amnesty International has been the second most active human rights organization targeting Olympic practices. Brownell judges that, in the run-up to Beijing, the 'NGOs provoked a transnational debate in which "human rights" in China played a central role. This level of influence was new in the Olympic context, and manifested the increased presence of NGOs in global politics'. Her LexisNexis search turned up 5243 items in all languages on the topic Beijing/Olympic/human rights. Though doubtless more extended given the subsequent development of electronic communication, NGOs had plenty to say during the anti-apartheid struggle of the 1970s and 1980s.

³³ It should be pointed out that 'sexual orientation and gender identity' was reduced to 'sexual orientation' in Agenda 2020's Resolution 14. Was this a mere verbal economy, or is it a significant reflection of a regime of clear-cut distinction between 'men's' and 'women's' sports events in the Olympic system which shows no inclination to wish to further complicate matters with 'transgender sport'.

³⁴ 'Human Rights Watch Submission: Olympic Agenda 2020'. Human Rights Watch press release, April 2014.

³⁵ Katie Ross Quant, 'Olympics to Crack Down on Human Rights Abuses . . . After 2022', *Mother Jones*, 21 October 2014. <http://www.motherjones.com/mixed-media/2014/international-olympic-committee-human-rights-clause-host-city-contracts>

³⁶ 'IOC New Host Contract Is Gold Medal for Human Rights Says Human Rights Watch', *Reuters*, 24 October 2014.

<http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/24/us-olympics-rights-idUSKCN0ID11L20141024>

³⁷ Minky Worden, ed. *China's Great Leap: The Beijing Games and Olympian Human Rights* (New York: Seven Stories Press, 2008). For a contrasting point of view, see Susan Brownell, 'Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics'.

³⁸ 'Olympics Host City Contracts To Ban Bias', Human Rights Watch press release, 25 September 2014. <http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/25/olympics-host-city-contracts-ban-bias>

³⁹ 'Olympics Host City Contracts Will Include Rights Protections', Human Rights Watch press release, 22 October 2014.

<http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/10/22/olympics-host-city-contracts-will-include-rights-protections>

⁴⁰ International Olympic Committee, 'Report of the 2002 Evaluation Commission', Annex B, List of Third Party External Reports. Lausanne, 2015, 107. Other consultants include: Coface on the country risk assessment, Economist Intelligence Unit on economic country reports, Rider Levett Bucknell on venue construction costs, International Union for Conservation of Nature on World Heritage site reports, Repucom for public support polling, UN-WHO on air quality data, and UN-Aquastat on water resources.

⁴¹ Human Rights Watch, 'World Report, 2015'. New York.

⁴² Daniel A. Bell, *Beyond Liberal Thought: Political Thinking for an East Asian Context*. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2006.

⁴³ This was first pointed out to me by Kyle Kurfirst.

⁴⁴ See Brownell, 'Human Rights and the Beijing Olympics', 312-4.

⁴⁵ International Tibet Network, 'Losing the Bet on Human Rights: Beijing, Tibet, and the Olympic Games', 2. <http://www.tibetnetwork.org/olympics2022>

⁴⁶ This managerial control comes at a severe price to the IOC itself, an embarrassing matter to many within the organization and so not publically discussed. In Beijing 2008, the IOC was so thoroughly set aside that it cancelled the customary daily coordination sessions with the OCOG. President Rogge announced that this unusual step was taken because everything was going so well that there was nothing to discuss. The real reason was that the Chinese government authorities saw little reason to bother, once the Games began, with the IOC. President Bach may be a stronger leader, but there is little doubt the same situation would obtain in 2022.

⁴⁷ 'Losing the Bet', 9.

⁴⁸ Evaluation Commission Report, 26.

⁴⁹ Human Rights Watch, 'World Report, 2015': 'Kazakhstan', 'China'. According to HRW, UN-HRC further asked Kazakhstan 'to review the religion law, amend the trade union law, release Zinaida Mukhortova, decriminalize defamation, and remove restrictions on freedom of assembly'. UN-CEAFDAW wants more 'effective investigations into complaints of violence against women'. UN-ERD recommended a 'comprehensive anti-discrimination law' and clarification of the present law on incitement of social discord. Certainly there seems room for progress in these rather straightforward matters.